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INTRODUCTION 
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the Trial Court's award of 
alimony, imputing wages (without using historical income), division of 
equity in marital assets and computing military retirement correctly was 
clearly erroneous and supported by adequate findings. 
Judy's attorney took an approach in court to discredit Larry on two issues 
in which Larry admitted in court before trial began, that he misrepresented. 
The two issues were the sale of two vehicles in Larry's possession and the 
sale of the Laundromat. Both the vehicles and the Laundromat were 
awarded to Larry. But yet council wants to use this as the primary issue 
again, as a basis for those in authority to base their decisions. Utah case law 
teaches that "correctness means the appellate court decides the matter for 
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of 
law." State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah App. 1992). The trial court 
abuses its discretion if its decision is beyond the limits of reasonableness. 
State v. Olsen. 860P. 2d, 332-334 (Utah 1993). 
The undisputed evidence established that Larry, the husband and 
appellant, did not have the ability to pay the alimony or child support given 
his income and expenses. Conversely, Judy failed to prove that she lacked 
the ability to pay her own reasonable expenses or the trial court need not 
1 
provide subsidiary findings on Larry's ability to pay alimony. This Court 
however has stressed the importance of subsidiary findings on both parties' 
ability to provide their own needs. See Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 557, 
& note 1, (Ut. Ct. App 1993) ('[I]n short, the payor spouse's reasonable 
needs are a necessary subsidiary step in determining the ability to provide 
support.') 
Judy has stated in her brief that Larry was underemployed and voluntarily 
unemployed, even though evidence (Tp. 634,637) was shown that the 
company he had worked for six years prior terminated him because the INF 
Treaty Contract with the Russians was not renewed (Tp 634). Larry also 
proved that he did try to obtain employment by a stack of applications 
submitted while he was unemployed. (Tp 557, Exhibit 9). Larry's counsel 
did not accept the stipulation of Judy's income of $7.50. and did offer 
evidence through Judy's own testimony, that she did make more money 
through other employment that she had worked prior to managing the 
Homestyle Laundromat business. (Tp 301-302). 
It is difficult to follow Appellee's brief titled "EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY", when it is not 
clear whom counsel is referring to Judy? or Larry? Did "Mrs. Cox suggest 
the trial court erred?" Or was it Mr. Cox? Did "Mrs. Cox fail to describe 
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how this happened?" Or was it Mr. Cox? It is very difficult to respond to 
this Brief when it is unclear of who said what? The fact of this matter is that 
there was no actual findings submitted by Judy that a loan was made against 
the equity of the Sego Lily home after separation of the two parties, as 
indicated in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Judy did not title 
it equity, but titled it Net Loan Proceeds (Para. 126). "In a divorce action 
there is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of debts. 
However, such allocation must be based upon actual findings which ruling 
we will not disturb absent in abuse of discretion." Rhen v. Rhen, 1999 t/tah 
App. 41, P 19, 974, P.2d 306 (citations omitted). 
Judy does not want the 10 months 14 days included in the Woodward 
formula, because she would get approximately $100 less a month than what 
she is getting. Larry does not want to cheat Judy out of her legal portion of 
the retirement. He, however, does want the dates to be correct of when he 
entered the military and what portion of that military time Judy was married 
to him. 
For these reasons and as discussed more fully below, the Trial Court's 
alimony award, imputed wages, division of property, and military retirement 
should be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. LARRY'S INABILITY TO PAY ALIMONY MAKES THE 
ALIMONY AWARD CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
A. The Undisputed Evidence Established Larry's Inability To 
Pay Alimony In The Amount Of $900/Month. 
In awarding alimony, the trial court must determine whether the obligor 
spouse has the ability, given his income and expenses, to provide support. 
Willey, supra, 866 P.2d at 550-51 &ft.l. "Failure to consider [this factor] 
in fashioning an alimony award constitutes an abuse of discretion." Id. In 
the instant case, the trial court failed to properly consider Larry's ability to 
pay given his income and expenses. Wiley, supra, 866 P.2d at 550-51 (A 
factual determination on payor spouse's financial need "is required for an 
assessment of the third Jones factor, the ability of the payor spouse to 
provide support.") Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 547 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) 
("[T]he findings should also address [payor's] needs and expenditures, such 
as housing, payment of debts, and other living expenses.") This evidence 
consisted of unemployment checks and military retirement benefits at trial 
which was (Tp 555): 
Date Gross Net 
7/1/2001 to 10/1/2001 $l,173.00(unemployment) $1,173.00 
3,293.00 (retirement) 970.00 
TOTAL: $4,466.00 $2,143.00 
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(The Military retirement was $3,293.00, after taxes $2,470.00, and after 
Judy took her half of $1,500.00, Larry had a net of $970.00.) The Trial 
Court never did consider Larry's ability to pay at the time of court, but what 
he could make. Money that Larry has never recognized! 
For the purpose of assessing his ability to pay alimony, Larry's opening 
brief before this Court used the net income amount of $2,800.00 and 
$2,850.00. See Appellant's Opening Brief at p.20. 
Larry also submitted the only evidence concerning his expenses. His 
monthly expenses was listed at $3,276.23 (Tp 405, Exhibit 64) and may be 
summarized as follows: 
Expenses Amount 
Mortgage 
Food 
Utilities 
Phone 
Clothing 
Medical 
Dental 
Entertainment 
Installment Payments 
Water 
Incidentals 
Insurance 
Maintenance 
Total 
$1,631.23 
400.00 
170.00 
50.00 
100.00 
35.00 
35.00 
100.00 
400.00 
75.00 
50.00 
100.00 
125.00 
: $3,276.23 
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Using this undisputed income and expenses, the Trial Court could not 
have found that Larry had the ability to pay $900/month in alimony. His 
total monthly expenses not including child support or alimony, are 
$3,276.23 permonth. [Tp. 149 Ex. 58 ]. When child support of $469 and 
alimony of $900 is added to this amount, his total expenses are $4,645.23 
per month. Given that Larry's monthly net income after taxes is, to include 
the military retirement, $2,800 and $2,850 per month. Larry does not have 
sufficient funds to pay his legitimate expenses and child support, much less 
an additional $900 a month for alimony. In fact his monthly deficit after 
alimony is between $1,845.00 and $1,900.00 a month. 
Judy called a Vocational Specialist, Dr. Famsworth, to provide her 
opinion, based on Larry's resume, what he should be making. Dr. 
Famsworth stated that Larry should be making upwards of $90,000, an 
income that Larry has never made. After trial Larry went to Dr. Famsworth 
to seek this type of employment. Dr. Famsworth, after charging $450 to 
rewrite his resume, gave him companies as well as web sites to submit his 
resume. Dr. Famsworth even suggested that Larry consider driving trucks in 
order to make this kind of income. After several months of unemployment 
and the future looking bleak, Larry decided to apply to the Corrections 
Academy, where there would be no discriminating against age. Larry passed 
the physical and the academic requirements to enroll in the Corrections 
Officer Academy, no small feat for a 58 year old. Larry was hired by the 
State in the Utah Department of Corrections working in the prison on 
January 14, 2002. Larry makes $11.41 per hour or $21,907.00 per year, 
which is $22,000 a year less than what Larry was imputed. 
Judy again tries to confuse the facts by stating that Larry was awarded the 
Laundromat and that it is a revenue producing asset. Although Judy makes 
these claims in her brief, she never supported this claim by reference to the 
record. Judy knows that the Laundromat was sold in April, 2001, 
approximately five months prior to trial and that the contract has since been 
turned over to a third party for relief of debts. Larry has not recognized any 
revenue from the sell of the Laundromat since trial. 
B. Judy Has Not Cited This Court To Any Evidence Tending 
To Show Larry Had The Ability To Pay The Alimony 
Awarded. 
Before this Court, Judy's argument on Larry's ability to pay border on 
the frivolous and must be rejected. She bases her arguments on factual 
allegations that are unsupported by the record or on legal assertions that are 
contrary to Utah law. Judy stated in her brief that Dr. Farnsworth opinion 
found that Mr. Cox could earn $90,000.00 per year and that Larry was 
underemployed over the past six years after retiring from the military at 
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$10.43 per hour.55 The ability to pay alimony is based on an opinion of what 
Larry could by making but has never made since retiring from the military 
six years prior. If Larry was voluntarily underemployed, why was it for six 
years after retiring from the military? This is a good example of why 
historical history is used to determine of what income should be imputed for 
the sake of alimony and child support. At the time of trial Larry's only 
income was unemployment benefits which was approximately $1,173.00 per 
month (Tp555). Judy mentions in her brief that Larry was receiving his 
military retirement as income, but again failed to mention that she was 
receiving half of this income also. Judy also states that together with the 
military retirement and the unemployment benefits is evidence that showed 
Larry's ability to pay. At the time of trial Larry was earning monthly 
$970.00 in military retirement and $1,173.00 in unemployment benefits. 
This equals $2,143.00 a month. After $900.00 for alimony and $469.00 for 
child support is taken from that income, Larry has $774.00 to live with. 
Larry's expenses were listed at $3,276.23 per month. Judy on the other hand 
had income wages ($1,200.00), Military Retirement ($1,537.05), Alimony 
($900.00), Child Support ($469.00), and Mother's rent ($600.00). This 
totals $4,706.00 per month. Judy's income is $3,932.00 per month greater 
then Larry's total monthly income. Today Larry is employed with the State 
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of Utah, as a corrections officer making $11.41 per hour or $1,825.00 per 
month (Exhibit A) Along with Larry's military retirement of $1,569.00 
(Exhibit B), he earns approximately $3,394.00. After alimony and child 
support Larry's gross spending power is $2,025.00, which is still $1,400 
below Judy's spending power and $2014.00 below his living expenses. 
To create the illusion that Larry has the ability to pay, Judy argues that 
Larry's gross income of $2,500.00 per month or what he could be making 
justifies a finding that Larry has the ability to pay. Judy however cites no 
case law for the proposition that gross income justifies an alimony award. 
This absence of legal support is not surprising given this Court's 
requirements that the trial court determine the payor spouse's net income in 
determining a payor spouse's ability to pay. Baker, supra, 866p.2dat 547. 
C. The Willey Case Does Not Justify The Trial Court 
Ignoring The Uncontroverted Evidence of Larry's Income 
and Expenses. 
Relying on Willey, the wife sought to establish a need for $660/month in 
medical expenses based on a one-time, non-recurring operation. The trial 
court rejected this expense because the evidence showed it was non-
recurring and the wife had not provided otherwise. The Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the Trial Court ruling and held: 
At trial, she had the burden of proving her monthly need 
for that amount. The trial court, however, expressly found that there 
9 
was no evidence to support such a need on a monthly basis and that the 
amount claimed was unreasonable. 
Willeyv. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 231 (Utah 1997). 
Willey does not support Judy's claim to alimony and shows the weakness 
of the Trial Court's findings in the instant case. In contrast to the trial court 
in Willey, the Trial Court in the instant case made no express findings 
concerning Larry's expenses and stated no reason why it should not accept 
those expenses. In fact, Judy in her testimony to this Court does not cite to 
anything in the record suggesting that Larry's expenses are unreasonable. 
Willey thus provides no basis for this Court or the Trial Court ignoring 
uncontroverted evidence of Larry's income and expenses. 
D. Judy Has Failed To Satisfy Her Burden of Proving Her 
Inability To Provide For Her Own Reasonable Needs. 
The evidence does not show that Judy's income is insufficient to satisfy 
her reasonable expenses. Even if Larry had the ability to pay child support, 
which he does not, Judy would not be entitled to an award of alimony unless 
she established her own inability to provide for her reasonable needs. 
Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P2.d 1065, 1068 (Ut Ct App. 1994) (The 
recipient spouse's need for payment to cover her expenses constitutes "the 
maximum permissible alimony award" regardless of payor spouse's ability 
to pay.) Such proof would require evidence not only of her ability to earn 
income, but also of her reasonable expenses. 
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As this Court held in Willey, Judy's proof of her own reasonable 
expenses and income is critically important to the Trial Court's balancing of 
the parties' competing needs. There, this Court held: 
We have previously reversed an alimony award in a similar case 
when the trial court failed to address the parties5 financial needs. In 
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991), because the parties 
4dissipated and lived on credit/ the trial court did not give 'much 
weight....as to what the needs and abilities of the parties might be.5 Id. 
at 492. Thus, the trial court failed to determine the reasonableness of 
the expenses each party claimed. This court reasoned that 'without a 
finding on reasonable expenses, we are unable to determine the true 
needs of Wife, or to determine Husband's actual ability to pay and, 
therefore, to balance Wife's needs against Husband's ability to pay as 
required in Jones.5 Id. at 493.Willey, supra, 866 P. 2d at 551 (emphasis 
supplied). 
As discussed below, Judy as failed to establish her financial need and this 
court must reverse the alimony award. See Willey, supra, 951 P.2d at 231 
(Party seeking alimony has burden of proving reasonableness of her 
expenses). 
1. Judy has the ability to work and earn income. 
In analyzing Judy's ability to provide for her own needs, the first 
consideration is her income-making ability. Judy owned and managed a 
Laundromat for approximately two years and also worked in cleaning homes 
at $10.00 per hour (Tp 570). Judy voluntarily quit the house cleaning job, 
and instead worked for a friend at the Chocolate Covered Wagon at the 
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minimum wage, as she so stated (Tp 258). She felt she should not work a 40 
hour week, because she needed to be at home with her 15 year old child. 
The child was in school most of the day. Judy did not want to work, she just 
wanted to live off of Larry and his laborers. The Trial Court found that 
since she was working at the Chocolate Covered Wagon for a friend at 
minimum wage that is what she should be imputed, completely ignoring her 
work history over the past six years that her and Larry were separated? No 
Income Taxes or W-2's were used to determine imputed wages for Judy, just 
three weeks of pay stubs (Tp 267). This is clearly abuse of discretion by the 
Trial Court in determining what Judy's earning ability should have been. 
2. Judy did not submit evidence on her living expenses, 
Judy did not address this issue in her brief, because she has not and cannot 
cite to anything in the record itemizing the amount or type of her living 
expenses. Judy seeks to avoid this lack of proof because she believes she 
has no burden to prove reasonable expenses. Both the Utah Supreme Court 
and this Court have made clear that such proof is required to establish an 
entitlement to alimony. Willey. Supra. 951 P.2d at 23L Willey, supra, 866 
P. 2d at 550-51. Since no such proof exists here, the alimony award must be 
reversed. 
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E. AN ALIMONY AWARD MUST BE SUPPORTED BY 
SUFFIECIENT FACTUAL FINDINGS SHOWING THAT 
THE AWARD IS RATIONALLY BASED UPON 
APPROPRITATE FACTORS. 
The Trial Court's factual findings do not show the steps or rationale by 
which trial court arrived at the conclusions to award alimony. A trial court's 
findings supporting an alimony award must include findings on all material 
issues. Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). This 
Court will reverse findings that fail to provide sufficient subsidiary findings 
"to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue 
was reached." Id. "[T]he trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings 
on each factor to enable a reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's 
discretionary determination was rationally based upon 'the three Jones 
factors." Willey, supra, 866 P.2d at 951. Findings on alimony are 
insufficient if they: do not specifically set for [the recipient's] financial 
condition and need for support, including her earning capacity, or [the 
payor's] income and ability to pay." Stevens, supra, 754 P.2d at 958. 
In the instant case, the Trial Court's findings with respect to alimony do 
not provide sufficient subsidiary findings to permit this Court to determine 
the steps by which the Trial Court reached its conclusion on alimony nor do 
the findings show the alimony award was rationally based on the appropriate 
factors. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992). 
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These findings do not address in any meaningful fashion either parties' 
income or expenses. They provide no explanation of how the Trial Court 
determined that Larry had the ability to pay or that Judy could not provide 
her own reasonable needs or how the Trial Court balanced these competing 
findings. See Willey, supra, 866 P.2d at 961. ("[W]ithout a finding on 
reasonable expenses, we are unable to determine the true needs of Wife, or 
to determine Husband's actual ability to pay and, therefore, to balance 
Wife's needs against Husband's actual ability to pay as required in Jones."), 
Chambers v. Chambers 840 P. 2d 841, 843 (Ut. Ct App. 1992). (Findings 
that do no more than simply state that, "the defendant has the ability to pay" 
are not sufficient). It is thus impossible to divine how the Trial Court 
arrived at its alimony award in this case. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPUTING WAGES 
WITHOUT USING HISTORICAL FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION 
Judy uses her demand that there was voluntary unemployed on the part of 
Larry? Larry worked for Lewis Bros. Stages from May 1993 to July 2001, 
approximately eight years without ever having a break between employment 
(Tp 634). Larry was terminated from employment in July 2001, because the 
INF treaty was never renewed between the Soviet Union and the United 
States (Tp 635). At no time did Larry ever volunteer to be unemployed and 
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was always seeking better employment. Like all other military veterans 
seeking employment, the age factor becomes a problem and the fear of 
retirement even a bigger problem. 
This trial court determined that Larry was voluntarily unemployed, even 
though evidence has proven that Larry was terminated because the contract 
was not renewed (Tp 634). This is not a case where the Respondent quit his 
job and did not want to find another job. Larry has worked from the day he 
was retired from the military on January 26, 1993 and was only unemployed 
for approximately six months during that eight year period. Presently Larry 
works for the State of Utah, Utah Department of Corrections, as a Correction 
Officer for $11.41 per hour. He cannot pay $900.00 per month for alimony! 
III. THE COURT ABUSED ITS' DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO DIVIDE THE VALUATION OF 
PROPERTY EQUALLY. 
The Appellee's brief states that the equity was divided equally by the 
spreadsheet, that Judy composed, showing the allocation of equity and debt 
between the parties (Pg. 9). Larry has stated "that the trial court's division 
of property assets, in which Judy received 100% of the total equity in both 
the Sego Lily home and the Riverton home in the form of a Net Loan 
Proceeds, (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Pg. 20) was an abuse 
of discretion." The Net Loan Proceeds, which Judy's attorney so cleverly 
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disguised as a credit, by adding that credit to Larry's total and calling it 
equity. In reality this is the amount ($54,704.00) that Judy claimed she 
borrowed against the Sego Lily home after the parties separated (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Pg. 15). The Loan papers against the Sego 
Lily home (Exhibit C) shows that the loan was taken in July 1995, the 
parties separated in October 1995. This amount was not divided as marital 
property, but as a loan credit that essentially eliminates the equity in the 
Riverton home that the spreadsheet shows as equity to Larry. Then Judy's 
attorney, dishonestly, confused a second loan taken with the Sego Lily home 
in 1997 (Exhibit D) that was taken after the parties' separated. July's 
attorney stated "in connection with the refinancing of the Sego Lily 
residence the Petitioner obtained the sum of $10,514.00 which she used to 
pay bills." {Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law, Pg. 16, Para. 98). This 
particular refinancing occurred in 1997 (Exhibit D). There were two 
different refinances done on the Sego Lily home, one in 1995 while the 
parties were still living together and one in 1997 when the parties were 
separated. (Exhibit C and Exhibit D). Petitioner confused the issue in 
making the trial court believe that the loan credit was an equity loan 
completed in 1997 after the parties' separated. This is not true and Exhibit C 
clearly shows the equity loan was done in July of 1995, with Judy putting 
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$25,000 in her personal account. The trial court erred by not using the loan 
documents as evidence, but taking Judy's word as the only evidence in 
making its' decision. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WITH RESPECT 
TO MILITARY RETIREMENT ARE ERRONEOUS. 
Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law, Pg 3. Para. 13 states: 
"Respondent's form DD-214 shows he entered the Army on December 10, 
1968 as an officer, but entered the Army on January 26,1968 and retired, 
as a Lieutenant Colonel, on January 31, 1993. From January 26, 1968 to 
January 31, 1993 is exactly 9,130 days of active duty time. This is the 
total time that Larry is being paid retirement on. Judy married Larry on 
November 18, 1971 (Tp. 387, 388, Ex. 63). Larry retired from the military 
on January 31, 1993. From November 18, 1971 to January 31, 1993 is 
exactly 7,741 married military days. 7,741 (Married Military Days) divided 
by 9,130 (Total Military Days) is exactly 84.78%. (Tp. 390). Judy is entitled 
to half of the 84.78% of the military time that she was married to Larry or 
42.39% of the retirement pay. "The appellate court can properly find abuse 
only if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court". 
State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885.887 (Utah 1978). 
CONCLUSION 
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Judy stated in her brief that Larry and her went to mediation and tried to 
work things out and finally resolve these problems. At mediation Judy's 
attorney stated that he was offended that my attorney did not show up. I 
came to terms with Judy at this meeting and agreed to the terms. But again 
what Judy's attorney fails to recognize is not what was agreed upon, but 
what he added to the divorce decree that was never talked about during the 
mediation that ruled in Judy's favor. Larry refused to honor such an 
agreement, because Judy's attorney did not honor their agreement by adding 
things to the divorce decree that were never discussed during mediation at 
that time. Mr. Wilde does not want to have this case resolved, because it 
would prevent him from lining his pockets with innocent people's life 
savings. 
Larry only wants equality and fairness in the legal decision making 
process so both parties can live their lives without any undue hardship. How 
can there be equality when Larry is left owing $90,000 in judgments and 
$900.00 a month in alimony and $469.00 a month in child support or 
$1,369.00 a month from employment wages that he only earns $11.41 per 
hour and nets approximately $1,367.80. He is virtually working for nothing. 
The above facts of this case clearly manifest injustice or inequity to Larry as 
to constitute a clear abuse of discretion. For these reasons and as set forth in 
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appellant's Opening Brief, this Court should reverse the award of alimony, 
recognize that Net Loan Proceeds was actually marital property, reverse the 
imputed wages because no historical income was used, and properly 
compute the military retirement so both Larry and Judy are treated equally. 
Dated this (f * day of January, 2003, 
LTC (R) 
19 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply 
Brief Of Appellant was mailed to the following via first class mail, postage 
paid thereon, this ^ day of y\ /Wu/4Ky 200X 
Robert H. Wilde 
935 East South Union Avenue Suite D-102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 255-4774 
EXHIBIT A 
Y. VAN COX 
PAY 
33'00 
54401 
TAXES 
'206133 
4<657i39l 
DESCRIPTION 
^AR EARNING 
?ORM ALLOW 
4TIVE AWRD 
LEAVE PAY 
LEAVE PAY 
)AY PAID 
PAY DOWN 
PAY DOWN 
DEDUCTIONS 
66167 
12 5 37 41 
HOURS 
72,00 
800 
PR23 
DOLLARS 
,82152 
! 20120 
91128! 
i 
i 
i 
PAY DATE 12-06-2002 
NET PAY 
660100 
14J943L27 
YEAR TO DATE 
1 8 I 9 7 7 I 8 4 
1186128 
,100>00 
1456140 
'273'84 
1723|12 
1
 4564 
! 9ll28 
TAX SUMMARY 
\s 
300 
440 
NON TAX PAY 
I 2Q2& 
18628 
PRE TAX DED. 
477 
52,47 
NET TAXABLE 
!9_Q8&2 
20615651 
AMOUNT 
OF WARRANT 
DEDUCTIONS 
FEDERAL TAX 
FICA/MED 
UTAH TAX 
PEHP ADDL LIFE 
PEHP BASC LIFE 
BOSTON ML AD&D 
PEHP CHLD LIFE 
BOSTON ML IDEM 
*MEDICAL INSUR 
UPEA ASSN 
MAIN CHECKING 
DENOTES EARNINGS/DEDUCTIONS NOT SUBJECT TO TAXES 
W-4 STATUS: S-01 ADDTL W/HOLD FED; 
|****,660'00 
CURRENT 
921261 
69,47 
44160! 
380.1 
9|53 
529 
!60 
1|45 
4,77 
6|92 
I 
I 
I 
5^1^191 
YEAR TO DATE 
2|0 75J23 
1,577,10 
110051061 
'7 24-09 
12 09l66| 
11270 
1 131201 
1 30;90 
, 52,47 
;no;72| 
i i 
i i 
i i 
i i 
4|666!09 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
IE BALANCES: 
\NNUAL LEAVE 
5ICK LEAVE 
INVERTED SICK 
:OMP TIME 
XCESS HOURS 
BEQ BALANCE 
86,001 
46'OOi 
191001 
24iQ0l 
EARNED 
41001 
4100 
1 USED/PAYOUT 1 
' ' 
.00 ST: 
CUR BALANCE 
901001 
50'OQI 
191001 
24,00 
ADVANCES: BEQ. BAL- - DED: CUR. BAL' 
$10.52(STEP 031) TO $18.59(STEP 052) CORRL OFFICER 
[T: $11.41 (STEP 034) LONGEVITY STEP 0 
.00 
EXHIBIT B 
«^WUUT STATEMENT 
I ' l l I I R I ' l l " 
MENT EFFECTIVE DATE 
APR 0 1 , 2002 
NEW PAY DUE AS OF 
MAY 0 1 , 2002 < 
;ftFA5~<Sl PfttNTS 6F tCmtktT 
SSN 
529 58 3229 
;E REMEMBER TO NOTIFY DFAS IF YOUR ADDRESS CHANGES 
LTC LARRY V COX USA RET 
2195 WEST 13250 SOUTH 
RIVERTON UT 84065-6229 
DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE 
CLEVELAND CENTER (CODE PRR) 
PO BOX 99191 
CLEVELAND OH 44199-1126 
COMMERCIAL (216) 522-5955 
TOLL FREE 1-800-321-1080 
TOLL FREE FAX 1-800-469-6559 
EMPLOYEE MEMBER SELF SERVICE (E/MSS) 
https //emss dfas mil/emss htm 
1-877-DOD-EMSS (1-877-363-3677) 
TEM D E S C R I P T I O N 
OLD Km.mm NEW ITEM BE OLD NEW 
PAY 
IVER 
.E INCOME 
3,603.00 
103-00 
3,500.001 
3,603-00 
103.00 
1,962.95 
FITW 
SITW 
ALLOTMENTS/BONDS 
FORMER SPOUSE DED 
NET PAY 
206.80 
150.00 
13-39 
900.00 
2,229.81 
17. 
150. 
13. 
1,750 
50 
00 
39 
00 
1,569.11 
nriADpft£gg~^ YEAR TO DATE SUMMARY ( FOR I NFORMAT I ON ONLY) 
DEPOSIT 
TAXABLE INCOME: 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX WITHHELD: 
STATE TAX WITHHELD FOR UTAH: 
14,000.00 
883.45 
600.00 
IE 
WITHHOLDING STATUS: MARRIED 
XEMPTIONS: 05 
INCOME TAX WITHHELD: 17-50 
STATE CODE: 
STATE INCOME TAX WITHHELD: 
UT 
150.00 
• R ' A E N E P I T PLAN ( SBP) COVERAGE ., gi.n.'.ai'rfS 
)P ELECTION IS REFLECTED ON YOUR ACCOUNT. 
EXHIBIT C 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
HOME EQUITY CREDIT LINE 
DISBURSEMENT REQUEST AND AUTHORIZATION 
PRINCIPAL LOAN DATE ACCOUNT NUMBER APPLICATION ID 
1* 50000.00 07/29/95 001101880000002886 105763 1 
BORROWER: LARRY V COX 
JUDY M OOX 
2202 E SBGO LILY 
SANDY, UT 84092 
DR 
LENDER ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
104TH SOUTH 
1634 SOUTH JORDAN PARKWAY 
SOUTH JORDAN, UT 84065 
H O M E E Q U I T Y CREDIT L INE 
D I S B U R S E M E N T R E Q U E S T A N D A U T H O R I Z A T I O N 
LOAN TYPE. This is a Variable Rate, Open-End Line of Credit Loan with a Credit Limit of $ 5 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 
PRIMARY PURPOSE OF LOAN. The primary purpose of this loan is for: 
XX Personal, Family, or Household Purposes or Personal Investment 
Business (Including Real Estate Investment) 
SPECIFIC PURPOSE. The specific purpose of this loan is 
DISBURSEMENT INSTRUCTIONS. I understand that no loan proceeds will be disbursed until any notice of righyto cancellation period 
las expired and all of Zions First National Bank's conditions for making the loan have been satisfied Plea&e^&burse the loan proceeds 
as follows: 
Amount paid to me directly: 
Amount paid on my accounts: 
DEPOSITED TO #90-316845 
$. 
$ . 
2 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Vmount paid to others for me: 
C R E D I T I N S U R A N C E D ISCLOSURE 
rOLUNTARY CREDIT INSURANCE. Credit Life Insurance and Credit Disability Insurance are not required to obtain credit and will not 
e provided unless I sign and agree to pay the additional cost. 
ty signing below- I acknowledge that I am not obtaining credit insurance for this loan for one of the following reasons, (a) I am not eligib 
:>r credit insurance; (b) Credit insurance is not available from Zions Bank; or (c) If I am eligible and credit insurance is available from 
Ions Bank J-'oo not want it. 
07/29/95 
DATE 
LTD 07/29/9' 
DATE 
EXHIBIT D 
HUD -1 UNIFORM SETTLEMENT STATEMEN I1 CEAiS i Sn 11 i in-
J.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT SETTLEMENT STATEMENT 
TPEOF I OAN 
3. •X Conv, I kins, 
I, Ft!A 
4, VA 
2. FmHA 
5. Conv, Ins. 
6. File Number: 
9903-172 
7. Loan Number: 
9 8 0 2 0 5 8 2 1 
8. Mortgage Insurance Case Number 
OTE: This form is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs. Amounts paid to and by the settlement agent are shown. Items marked "(p.o.c.)" 
id outside the closing; they arc shown here for informational purposes and are not included in the totals. 
NOTE: TIN = Taxpayer's Identification Number 
AME AND ADDRESS OF BORROWER: 
East Sego Lily Drive 
', Utah 84092 
E. NAME, ADDRESS AND TIN OF SELLER: F. NAME AND ADDRESS OF LENDER: 
C i t y Mo r i ga- ' jc 
OPERTY LOCATION: 
East Sego Lily Drive 
, Utah 84092 
H. SETTLEMENT AGENT NAME, ADDRESS AND TIN 
R o b e ^ u iut i. : 
4 6 2 5 S o u t h 2 3 0 ' . 
,, Attorney 
i-L, SLC, Utah 3 4 i i 7 
PLACE OF SETTLEMENT 
same as above 
I. SETTLEMENT DATE 
I , j y y 
J. SUMMARY OF BORROWER'S TRANSACTION 
SS AMOUNT DUE FROM BORROWER: 
act sales price 
lal property 
nent charges to borrower (Line 1400) 
k of America 
i s B a n k 
tstments for items paid by seller in advance 
wn taxes 
'taxes 
nents 
i t a i n America C.U. 
' S L*>^-rS 4" a TTiM^f 
-<?,<2.»<i- <h" YveeJiJcL \iu'S n 
*? u»^4l**— ^ W*'-.' 
AMOUNT DUE FROM BORROWER 
5 , 4 8 3 . 5 9 
9 8 , 8 2 4 . 2 0 
5 1 , 2 5 0 . 1 7 
1 0 , 5 1 4 . 0 0 
re± <\_. <:_i*r£\<~ 
1 6 6 , 0 7 1 . 9 6 
K. SUMMARY OF SELLER'S TRANSACTION 
400. GROSS AMOUNT DUE TO SELLER: 
401. Contract sales price 
402. Personal property 
403. 
404. 
-
405. 
Adjustments for items paid by seller in advance 
406. City/town taxes 
407. County taxes 
408. Assessments 
409. ! 
410. 
411. 
412. 
420. GROSS AMOUNT DUE TO SELLER IZZL 
— — 
NTS PAID BY OR IN BEHALF OF BORROWER: 
or earnest money 
1 amount of new loan(s) 
loan(s) taken subject to 
)wer D e p o s i t __ 
T 0^)1 -rV<3 
r 
1 6 8 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 
_ ^ r 3 5 0 . 0 0 
icnts for items unpaid by seller 
taxes 
CCS 
ts 
500. REDUCTIONS IN AMOUNT DUE TO SELLER: 
501. Excess deposit 
502. Settlement charges to seller (Line 1400) 
503. Existing loan(s) taken subject to 
504. Payoff of first mortgage loan 
505. Payoff of second mortgage loan 
506. 
50T 
508. 
• i 
509. | 
Adjustments for items unpaid by seller 
510. City/town taxes 
511. County taxes 
512. Assessments 1 
513. j 
514. j 
« • • 
